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The model developed in this chapter shows that differences in   incentives of firms to list can have an impact on 
the decision of   exchanges concerning the level of listing requirements they set, and   on the gains obtained by 
firms when they list on an exchange with   stringent listing requirements. When firms bear listing costs that are   
uncorrelated with their quality, changing the level of listing   requirements or introducing additional segments with 
different listing   requirements changes the distribution of listed firms and affects   thereby indirectly the values of 
listed firms. This indirect effect   can either enforce or weaken the direct impact of more precise   information on 
the value of firms. If the difference in the incentives   to list among firms of the same quality is small, the exchange 
might   be induced to set a high level of listing requirements, which leads to   a high information efficiency in the 
economy. If these differences are   large, the exchange never sets a high level of listing requirements   and 
efficiency is impeded. 
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1.   Introduction 
 
This chapter analyzes to what extent listing on a stock market can reduce information 
asymmetries between firms and investors. One important traditional function of exchanges 
has been to certify the quality of listed firms. Many stock markets list firms on the basis of 
listing  requirements  going  from  a  minimum  market  capitalization  to  specific  corporate 
governance standards. However, the stock market industry has undergone deep changes in the 
last decades. The reasons for these changes are mainly that competition among exchanges for 
volume  and  listings  has  sharpened  and  that  exchanges  have  increasingly  become 
demutualized and even listed companies. Today a debate is taking place on whether profit 
maximizing and competing exchanges will or even should continue to regulate listings. Also, 
while regulators tend to tighten listing requirements, exchanges increasingly create lightly 
regulated listing venues. Although some argue that certification is not compatible with profit 
maximization (Macey and O’Hara (2005)), others show that exchanges might set high listing 
requirements in equilibrium because this enhances their reputation (Chemmanur and Fulghieri 
(2006)), or increases liquidity (Huddart et al. (1999)). The present analysis complements this 
literature by analyzing how differences in listing incentives among firms of the same quality 
affect the listing decision of firms, and thereby the decisions about listing requirements taken 
by an exchange. It also explores the consequences of the existence of differently regulated 
segments on the listing choices of firms. 
A large part of the literature in finance and in accounting has analyzed the benefits and 
costs of information disclosure and enhanced listing requirements. These papers find that 
firms might incur important costs, such as proprietary costs, when they disclose information. 
Costs related to the compliance with listing requirements also seem to play an important role 
in the listing decision of firms.
1 These costs are not necessarily related to the quality of firms 
but might depend on the institutional environment of firms, or on their internal organization 
and corporate habits. Such costs create different incentives for firms of the same quality to list 
on an exchange with stringent listing requirements. The present study analyzes the impact of 
                                                 
1 See Bancel and Mittoo 2001, Baba and Yamori 2001, Houston and Jones 2002 and Mittoo 1992 for enquiries 
of  managers  form  Canadian,  European  and  Japanese  firms  having  listed  their  firms  in  the  US.  The  World 
Federation of Exchanges underlined in its « Disclosure Survey » for 2003 the necessity for regulators to take into 
account the costs created by regulations concerning listings. this  type  of  costs  on  the  listing  choices  of  firms  as  well  as  on  the  decision  of  a  profit 
maximizing exchange on listing requirements. 
  In  the  present  analysis  we  show  that  optimal  listing  requirements  set  by  a  profit 
maximizing  exchange  depend  on  how  efficiently  listing  requirements  reveal  information 
about firms, which in turn depends strongly on the structure of the incentives of firms to list. 
Consider listing requirements  which contribute to  the revelation  of information  about  the 
quality of the firm. All else equal, firms of a high quality always benefit from precise public 
information,  since  the  information  increases  their  expected  market  value.  Firms  of  a  low 
quality, in contrast, dislike precise public information, since it reduces their expected market 
value. Thus, if firms only differ in quality, good firms always prefer to list on an exchange 
with stringent enough listing requirements to deter bad firms from listing, as this reveals 
perfectly the type of good firms. If however, firms of both qualities differ in compliance costs, 
and if cost differences are uncorrelated to the quality of firms, good firms with high costs 
might be deterred from listing while bad firms with low costs would still list. In this case, 
changes in listing requirements alter the distribution of high quality and low quality firms that 
list. The valuation gains which firms obtain from listing depend not only on the level of listing 
requirements but also on the proportion of high quality firms among all listed firms on the 
exchange. The sorting of firms can either enforce or weaken the effect of listing requirements 
on  the  valuation  of  firms.  If  the  sorting  of  firms  enforces  the  effect  of  higher  listing 
requirements, a profit maximizing exchange might be induced to set a high level of listing 
requirements leading to high information efficiency in the economy. If, however, the sorting 
of  firms  weakens  the  effect  of  high  listing  requirements,  the  highest  level  of  listing 
requirements an exchange might choose in equilibrium is always smaller than in the previous 
case. As a consequence, the certification role of listings depends on the differences in the 
incentives of firms to list. 
The model developed in this chapter has the following main ingredients: There is an 
exchange which sets listing requirements that firms must satisfy in order to list. The quality of 
firms is unknown to investors. Listing requirements allow investors to observe a noisy signal 
about the firms’ quality. Investors update their belief about the firms’ value according to the 
public  information  about  firms.  Complying  with  listing  requirements  is  costly  for  firms. 
Compliance costs differ across firms and are not correlated to the quality of firms.  When 
firms list they can realize a growth opportunity. They will do so if the expected increase in 
their market value exceeds the incurred compliance costs. The exchange charges a listing fee 
which is proportional to the firms’ market value. It faces a trade-off between listing a high number of firms and listing a small number of highly valued firms when it determines the 
level of listing requirements. 
The results are as follows: If there is a small difference between the highest and the 
lowest level of compliance costs among firms of the same quality, the main determinant of the 
listing  decision  of  firms  is  their  valuation  gain  stemming  from  listing  and  from  public 
information. The valuation gain depends on the level of listing requirements and on the type 
and number of firms that list. It is always larger for high quality firms than for firms with a 
low quality. Also, the difference in the net gain from listing is large between good firms with 
high compliance costs and bad firms with low compliance costs. This might induce a profit 
maximizing exchange to optimally set a high level of listing requirements, at which high 
quality firms separate from low quality firms by listing. In this case, information about the 
values of firms is perfectly revealed through this sorting effect. This is likely to occur when 
the number of good firms in the economy is small. 
If there is a large difference between the highest and the lowest level of compliance 
costs among firms of the same quality, the difference in the net gain from listing is small 
between good firms with high compliance costs and bad firms with low compliance costs. In 
this case, the effect of listing requirements is always weakened. While good firms with high 
costs are deterred from listing, bad firms with low costs still list. Thus the sorting of firms 
occurs not only according to quality but also according to compliance costs. In this case, a 
complete  separation  of  firms  according  to  their  quality  through  the  means  of  a  listing  is 
impossible. The exchange never sets a high listing requirement in equilibrium because the 
valuation gain of listed firms is smaller due to the smaller number of listed good firms. Except 
when only high quality firms with low costs list on the exchange, the values of listed firms are 
inefficient on the exchange because firms of different qualities pool. However, the sorting of 
firms  also  affects  the efficiency of values outside the exchange since non listed firms  of 
different  qualities  also  pool.  As a consequence, information  efficiency in  the economy is 
impeded when incentives to list differ strongly among firms of the same quality. 
While  increasing  listing  requirements  might  improve  information  efficiency  in  the 
economy when the difference in compliance costs is small, the fact that firms are deterred 
from listing might impede social welfare. Non listed firms do not bear compliance costs but 
forgo a growth opportunity. Since the most efficient equilibrium, i.e. the one in which firms 
completely separate according to their quality, is only obtained with a high level of listing 
requirements, it creates two sources of welfare losses: the forgone growth opportunities by all 
low quality firms as well as the high compliance costs borne by all high quality firms. Thus, there is a tension between limiting welfare losses and improving efficiency. This tension is 
exacerbated by the existence of different compliance costs among firms of the same quality, 
since the level of listing requirements necessary to deter the low quality firm with the smallest 
compliance costs is high. 
When, in addition to the existing segment, a new segment with a different level of 
listing  requirements  is  introduced  on  the  exchange,  firms  sort  between  the  two  segments 
according  to  their  valuation  gains  and  compliance  costs,  as  before.  The  existence  of  an 
additional segment alters the valuation gain and consequently the number of listed firms on 
the previously existing segment. In particular, if an additional segment is created with tighter 
listing requirements than those prevailing on the existing segment, a smaller number of firms 
list on the existing segment because the expected valuation gain is smaller. This is because 
good firms with low costs are attracted by the segment with high listing standards, leaving the 
existing segment (which has lower listing standards) with mainly low quality firms. This, in 
turn, reduces the gain of listing on this segment. 
This model yields several empirical implications on the competition for listings, on 
valuation  effects  related  to  changes  in  listing  requirements,  on  the  impact  of  listing 
requirements  on  the  incentives  of  managers  or  controlling  shareholders  to  extract  private 
benefits, on the relationship between the choice of a listing place by firms and decisions of a 
profit maximizing exchange and on the link between the choice of a listing place by firms and 
what it signals about the characteristics of firms. In particular, the valuation effect related to a 
listing on an exchange with stringent listing requirements is not only related to individual 
characteristics of firms, but also to the characteristics of the firms in the same industry or 
country as well as to whether the exchange has several segments or not. Also, if an exchange 
tightens listing requirements, it is likely to lose firms from industries or countries in which 
firms  have  diverging  incentives  to  comply  with  listing  requirements.  The  debate  about 
whether the attractiveness of US stock markets has been reduced following the introduction of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 looks primarily on the link between firms’ characteristics and 
the cross listing decisions of firms. The findings in this chapter suggest that this literature 
should also consider the characteristics of the pool of firms among which some choose to 
cross-list. As another implication, listing or delisting decisions of firms following changes in 
regulation can be an indication about the existence of hidden characteristics of firms such as 
proprietary costs. Also,  when incentives  to  extract  private benefits  are  considered, tighter 
listing requirements might not necessarily reduce the incentives to extract private benefits. The  distribution  of  listed  firms  might  allow  those  firms  with  private  benefit  extraction 
problems to better hide among the other firms and to be recognized with a smaller probability.  
This  analysis  complements  literature  on  the  choice  of  listing  places  by  firms  and 
literature  on  listing  and  disclosure  requirements.  The  listing  decisions  of  firms  are  often 
motivated  by  the  possibility  to  send  a  signal  about  their  quality.  Staughton  et  al.  (2001) 
develop a model in which firms list on a stock market in order to signal the quality of their 
products. Consumers infer the product quality from the stock price.
 2 Surveys of managers of 
non US firms that are cross-listed in the US indicate that revealing information about the 
firm’s quality is one of the most important motivations for cross-listings (Bancel and Mittoo 
(2001), Baba and Yamori (2001), Houston and Jones (2002), Mittoo (1992)). The idea of 
signalling in the context of cross-listings is related to the theories of legal bonding (Coffee 
(2002))  or  reputational  bonding  (Siegel  (2005)).  Firms  signal  their  quality  by  bonding 
themselves  to  tough  listing  requirements,  strong  regulatory  bodies,  or  reputational 
intermediaries.
3  Based  on  these  theories,  Fuerst  (1998)  develops  a  model  in  which  firms 
issuing high profitability reports list on the strictest regulated exchange whereas firms issuing 
low profitability reports list on less strict exchanges, provided that the difference in regulatory 
strictness  between  exchanges  is  high  enough.  Consistent  with  the  signalling  hypothesis, 
Doidge et al. (2004 and 2009) document an increase in the market value of firms cross-listed 
in the US (the so called “cross-listing premium”). 
However,  some  studies  challenge  the  signalling  hypothesis  by  showing  that  many 
other criteria than listing requirements determine the choice of listing places: the presence on 
a foreign product market (Biddle and Saudagaran  (1995), Pagano et al. (2002)), the size, 
sector  and  strategy  of  firms  (Pagano  et  al.  (2002))
4,  the  origin  as  well  as  the  economic, 
industrial, cultural and geographic proximity
5 of the host country relative to the home country 
(Sarkissian  and  Schill  (2004),  Pagano  et  al.  (2001),  Bancel  and  Mittoo  (2001)).  Tough 
                                                 
2 The certification mechanism stems from the willingness of the listed firms to subject themselves to the scrutiny 
of outside analysts and relies on the existence of a large body of investors that engage actively in the price 
discovery process. 
3 Siegel shows that in the case of Mexican firms cross-listed in the US, the market punished firms that were 
accused of large-scale asset taking in Mexico, but that were not prosecuted by the SEC. Business press and 
analysts tracking governance abuses strengthen this reputation mechanism.  
4 Pagano et al. (2002) show that European firms that cross-listed in the U.S. between 1986 and 1998 were 
different from those listed in Europe only. U.S. listed firms pursued a strategy of rapid equity-funded expansion 
and belonged in the majority to high-tech sectors. On the contrary, in Europe listed firms were more mature and 
less growing, relied less on exports and didn’t come from high-tech sectors. 
5 Geographic proximity is the great circle distance between the capitals of countries, economic proximity is the 
percentage of country i’s exports to country j, industrial proximity is the correlation between industry rankings, 
and cultural proximity is a dummy variable equal to one if languages are the same, or if there was a colonial 
relationship between countries. perfect and  ) 1 ( f Ig    . Both marginal firms increase the higher the net gain form listing is. 
This is the case, the lower the listing fee is, the higher the growth opportunity is and the 
higher  the  difference  in  qualities, x  ,  is.  However,  changes  in  the  marginal  firms  affect 
posterior beliefs of investors and thus the information gain of firms, which in turn influence 
marginal firms in equilibrium. The smaller the number of listed bad firms is and the higher the 
number of listed good firms is, the higher is the information gain of all listed firms. This 
encourages more firms of both types to list. However, the higher number of listed bad firms 
reduces the information gain of both types of firms, causing fewer of them to list. 
How the level of the listing requirements affects the number and type of listed firms 
depends on how changes in the marginal  firms influence information gains. A change in 
listing requirements affects the number of listed firms directly through the change in costs and 
the impact of more precise information on their value. While the direct effect of an increase of 
the precision is always negative for the marginal bad firm (the information gain decreases but 
the compliance cost increases), it has an ambiguous effect on the marginal good firm since the 
listing cost as well as the information gain increase. A change in listing requirements has also 
an indirect effect through the impact of changing marginal firms on the expected information 
gains.  For  instance,  if  the  marginal  good  firm  increases  with  the  signal  precision,  the 
information gain of bad firms increases, inducing more of them to list, which in turn reduces 
the information gain of both types of firms. In contrast, if the marginal good firm decreases 
with the signal precision, the information gain of bad firms diminishes, inducing less of them 
to list. This, however, increases the information gain of firms of both types. Consequently, the 
indirect effect related to changes in marginal firms can either enhance or weaken the direct 
effect of a change in listing requirements on the value of firms. This indirect effect finds its 
origin in the differing cost factors among firms of the same quality. If compliance costs were 
equal for all firms or correlated with their quality (bad firms incurring higher compliance 
costs than good ones), good firms would always list as long as bad firms list since their 
valuation gain is always higher. 
 
 3.2.  Incentives to list and listing requirements 
 
For a given cost factor, bad firms always benefit less from listing than good firms. 
Those firms among bad ones with the highest compliance costs are deterred from listing at 
levels of listing requirements at which all good firms still list (i.e. signal precisions for which a  profit-maximizing  exchange  might  set  a  high  level  of  listing  requirement  even  without 
reputation considerations. 
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the model. Section 3 describes 
the incentives of firms and the equilibrium choices of an exchange with regard to listing 
requirements. Section 4 discusses information efficiency and welfare, and shows how these 
are  related  to  the  incentives  of  firms  and  the  exchange’s  optimal  decisions.    Section  5 
discusses the existence of segments with different listing requirements. Section 6 discusses 
implications. Conclusions are stated in section 7. All proofs are given in the appendix. 
 
2.   Model 
 
Consider firms  which are either  good  ( g x ), or bad ( b x ), with  x  the firms’ value 
known only to the firm’s manager and  0   b g x x . The proportion of good firms in the 
economy is   1 , 0    and is common knowledge. Firms can realize a growth opportunity, z, if 
they list on an exchange. 
Firms which list must pay a fee to the exchange. It is a fraction, ) 1 , 0 (  f , of their 
market value.
6 The exchange also sets listing requirements that all listed firms must satisfy. 
Listing requirements might comprise reporting information about the firms’ prospects as well 
as meeting corporate governance rules. They allow investors to observe a signal, s, about the 
value of listed firms. The level of listing requirements is represented by the precision of the 
signal,  5 . 0   , which is common knowledge.
7 With probability    investors observe the true 
type of listed firms. They observe the wrong type otherwise. Firms are assumed to reveal only 
the information required by the exchange. In a dynamic setting (which is not modeled here), 
this  might  for  instance  be  the  case  if  firms  refrain  from  setting  a  disclosure  precedent. 
Changes in the future towards less informative voluntary disclosure might be perceived as bad 
news by investors and firms might want to avoid this situation. 
The exchange is a monopoly in listing. It determines the level of listing requirements 
to maximize its profit, . The listing fee is a parameter because the analysis focuses on how 
listing requirements  can improve the informativeness  of the value of firms. A listing  fee 
                                                 
6 A similar definition of the listing fee is used in Chemmanur and Fulghieri (2006). Many exchanges have listing 
fees which are staggered according to the size of the issuing firms or the number of issued shares. The case of a 
fixed listing fee is discussed at the end. 
7 In Chemmanur and Fulghieri (2006), the exchange selects the firms for listing. They define listing requirements 
in a similar way: the latter determine the probability with which the exchange accepts a firm that is not qualified 
for listing. determined endogenously would affect the number of firms which choose to list. It would 
therefore depend on the market value of firms. It is not used in the present model because it 
would render the analysis intractable. In the baseline model developed in the present chapter, 
the  exchange  determines  a  unique  signal  precision  that  applies  to  all  listed  firms.  In  an 
extension, the exchange can set up two segments with different levels of listing requirements. 




 c C  . The 
cost scaling factor, c, is uniformly distributed over the interval  h l c c , for firms of both types. 
Thus, the compliance costs are not correlated to the value of firms. These costs represent 
direct costs as well as indirect costs. Direct costs are for instance the establishment of reports 
according to some standards, or changes in the internal structure of firms to comply with the 
imposed requirements. These costs may differ across firms due to differences in their internal 
structure, corporate habits, or cultural contexts. Listing requirements can also lead to higher 
costs related to private benefit extraction from the point of view of a manager. Doidge et al. 
(2004) develop and test a model in which enhanced investor protection rules increase the cost 
of private benefit extraction. They expose evidence consistent with the idea that controlling 
shareholders of firms cross listed in the US commit to limit extraction of private benefits only 
if growth opportunities that can be realized through the cross- listing are large enough.  Leuz 
et al. (2008) as well as Marosi and Massoud (2007, 2008) find that firms (from the US as well 
as from outside the US) which were listed on a US exchange and which went dark or delisted 
after the adoption of the Sarbanes Oxley Act had not only poor future prospects  but also a 
stronger insider control. This suggests the existence of larger costs related to the compliance 
with the Sarbanes Oxley Act for firms with a concentrated ownership. Indirect costs may 
represent costs firms incur due to more transparency and enhanced reputation. These comprise 
for instance  proprietary  costs which occur when competing firms  set  up more aggressive 
strategies on the product market on the basis of the disclosed information, and contribute 
thereby to lower the profit of the firm which discloses information. Empirical research has 
displayed evidence consistent with the existence of proprietary costs (Leuz (2004), Nichols 
and Street (2007)). Also, these costs seem to depend on the characteristics of firms and on the 
characteristics of their industry. According to Leuz (2004), for instance, firms from highly 
competitive industries tend not to disclose segment information on average. Leuz interprets this as consistent with the existence of proprietary costs for these firms.
8 Another indirect cost 
related  to  more  transparency  is  the  risk  of  litigations  since  it  is  difficult  to  disentangle 
truthfully reported information that turned out to be wrong from disclosed false information 
(Healy  and  Palepu  (2001)).  According  to  a  survey  of  CFO’s  by  Graham  et  al.  (2005), 
potentially  enhanced  litigation  costs  and  proprietary  costs  are  among  the  most  important 
factors inducing firms not to disclose information voluntarily. The cost can also be interpreted 
as an opportunity cost: the time spent to comply with the requirements not used to develop 
new projects. Recent empirical literature on regulation changes suggests that some firms incur 
important costs when they have to comply with enhanced disclosure requirements. Bushee 
and Leuz (2005), for instance, show that after the introduction of SEC disclosure rules on the 
OTC Bulletin Board, firms which began complying with these rules experienced significant 
liquidity increases while the average stock market reaction related to the change in regulation 
was small or negative. They interpret this evidence as indicating the existence of costs related 
to the new disclosure rules. In the same vein, the Sarbanes Oxley act is associated with large 
costs according to Zhang (2007) and Engle et al. (2007).
9 To sum up, prior evidence indicates 
the existence of costs associated with listing rules and the possibility that these costs differ 
across firms. Since the aforementioned costs are to a large extent unobservable, I assume that 
compliance costs are private knowledge of the firm in this model. 
Investors adjust their beliefs about the quality of firms according to the information 
they observe, that is whether and where a firm is listed and the signal provided by listing 
requirements. They do not possess private information on firms. The updated probability that 
a  firm  is  a  good  firm  is  given  a  good  signal  gs g g p x s x P   ) (   ,  and  for  a  bad  signal
bs b g p x s x P   ) ( . If a firm is not listed, the probability that it is a good firm is  nl p . All non 
listed firms have the same value. 
The game is organized in three stages. In the first stage, the exchange determines its 
level of listing requirements to maximize its profit, . In stage 2, firms decide whether to list 
to  maximize  their  market  value  net  of  the  listing  fee  and  compliance  costs.  In  stage  3, 
investors update their beliefs.  
 
                                                 
8 See for instance Verrecchia (1983, 2001) and Dye (1986) for theoretical arguments on proprietary costs in the 
context  of  voluntary  disclosure  decisions  of  firms.  A  similar  argument  was  also  developed  in  the  banking 
literature  to  explain  different  debt  financing  choices  of  firms  depending  on  whether  they  are  subject  to 
proprietary costs or not (Yosha (1995), Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995)). 
9 See Leuz (2007) for a critical discussion of these papers. 3.   Optimal listing requirements 
 
3.1. Firms’ incentives 
 
A  listing  affects  the  value  of  firms  through  the  possibility  to  realize  a  growth 
opportunity and through the signal firms provide to the market. Due to the signal, the market 
values of listed firms are closer to their true type than when a stock market does not exist. The 
market value net of listing costs (the listing fee and compliance costs) expected by firms 
choosing to list is for good and bad firms: 
 
  ) ( ) ( ( ) 1 ( ) (   C p p p x x z f MV E bs gs bs b g               (1) 
  ) ( ) )( 1 ( ( ) 1 ( ) (   C p p p x x z f MV E bs gs bs b b              (2) 
b g x x x     
 
The expected market value of both types of firms increases with the size of the growth 
opportunity. The precision of information affects market values in opposite ways. While, all 
else equal, an increase in the signal precision allows good firms to be better recognized and 
increases their valuation, it renders hiding more difficult for bad firms and depresses their 
value. Firms list if and only if they expect their market value to increase far enough to offset 
listing costs. The incentives of firms to list depend not only on the quality of firms and the 
precision of information required by the exchange, but also on their compliance cost level, c. 
The firm which is indifferent between listing and not listing is the marginal firm,  i c ~ with 
b g i ,  . Only firms with cost levels below those of the marginal firms, list. The market values 
of firms if they do not list are not directly influenced by the signal precision on the exchange. 
However,  they  depend  on  the  number  of  good  and  bad  firms  that  remain  unlisted  and 
therefore on the incentives of firms to list, which in turn are related to the signal precision. At 
a given signal precision, , incentive constraints for good and bad firms are:  
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  i I   , with  b g i ,  , represents the valuation gain of firms due to the signal they have 
provided to the market. It is called information gain in the rest of the analysis. The gain from 
listing  obtained  by  good  and  bad  firms  differs  solely  in  this  variable.  If  all  firms  list  (
h b g c c c   ~ ~ ),  posterior  beliefs  of  investors  depend  only  on  the  signal  precision  and  the 
number of firms of both types in the economy. In this case, a higher signal precision allows 
investors to better recognise the true type of firms. It increases the information gain of good 
firms while it decreases the information gain of bad firms. If the marginal firms are inside the 
cost interval such that only a sub-set of good and bad firms list, posterior beliefs of investors 
depend not only on the signal precision and the number of good firms in the economy, but 
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A higher proportion  of good firms  among all listed firms  reduces  the probability that an 
observed signal stems from a bad firm. This increases the updated probabilities that a firm is 
good given a good or a bad signal. Since a higher proportion of good firms on the exchange 
leads to a smaller proportion of these firms outside the exchange, the expected value of non 
listed firms decreases. The information gain of firms of both qualities increases always when 
the proportion of good firms on the exchange rises. In contrast, a decrease in this proportion 
lowers the information gain of all listed firms.  
For any given number of firms and any given signal precision, good firms have a 
higher information gain than bad ones. Thus, listed good firms are more numerous than listed 
bad firms:  b g c c ~ ~  . If all good firms list and are the only firms to list, information revelation is perfect and  ) 1 ( f Ig    . Both marginal firms increase the higher the net gain form listing is. 
This is the case, the lower the listing fee is, the higher the growth opportunity is and the 
higher  the  difference  in  qualities, x  ,  is.  However,  changes  in  the  marginal  firms  affect 
posterior beliefs of investors and thus the information gain of firms, which in turn influence 
marginal firms in equilibrium. The smaller the number of listed bad firms is and the higher the 
number of listed good firms is, the higher is the information gain of all listed firms. This 
encourages more firms of both types to list. However, the higher number of listed bad firms 
reduces the information gain of both types of firms, causing fewer of them to list. 
How the level of the listing requirements affects the number and type of listed firms 
depends on how changes in the marginal  firms influence information gains. A change in 
listing requirements affects the number of listed firms directly through the change in costs and 
the impact of more precise information on their value. While the direct effect of an increase of 
the precision is always negative for the marginal bad firm (the information gain decreases but 
the compliance cost increases), it has an ambiguous effect on the marginal good firm since the 
listing cost as well as the information gain increase. A change in listing requirements has also 
an indirect effect through the impact of changing marginal firms on the expected information 
gains.  For  instance,  if  the  marginal  good  firm  increases  with  the  signal  precision,  the 
information gain of bad firms increases, inducing more of them to list, which in turn reduces 
the information gain of both types of firms. In contrast, if the marginal good firm decreases 
with the signal precision, the information gain of bad firms diminishes, inducing less of them 
to list. This, however, increases the information gain of firms of both types. Consequently, the 
indirect effect related to changes in marginal firms can either enhance or weaken the direct 
effect of a change in listing requirements on the value of firms. This indirect effect finds its 
origin in the differing cost factors among firms of the same quality. If compliance costs were 
equal for all firms or correlated with their quality (bad firms incurring higher compliance 
costs than good ones), good firms would always list as long as bad firms list since their 
valuation gain is always higher. 
 
  3.2.  Incentives to list and listing requirements 
 
For a given cost factor, bad firms always benefit less from listing than good firms. 
Those firms among bad ones with the highest compliance costs are deterred from listing at 
levels of listing requirements at which all good firms still list (i.e. signal precisions for which h g c c  ~ ).  If  the  cost  interval, l h c c  ,  is  small,  incentives  of  firms  are  mainly  driven  by 
information gains. In this case, the difference in the surplus between good and bad firms with 
the  same  cost  factor  remains  large  as  the  signal  precision  increases.  This  is  because  the 
common factor in the surplus, the compliance cost, weights little compared to the diverging 
changes in information gains. There is a level of listing requirements,  sep 
~
, at which all bad 
firms are deterred from listing while all good firms list.
10 For  sep 
~
 to be attractive for the good 
firms with the highest compliance costs, the cost interval,  l h c c  , must be small enough. A 
necessary condition for separation of firms is: 
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l h c c c     
 
If the interval on compliance costs is small enough to allow separation of firms, and if 
initially firms of both types are listed ( sep  
~
 ), the marginal bad firm decreases with the  
signal precision. Since the number of listed good firms remains constant as long as bad firms 
list, the bad firms are adversely affected by an increase in   through a higher compliance cost 
and  a  smaller  information  gain.  If  only  good  firms  list  (if  sep  
~
 ),  an  increase  in  the 
precision also reduces the number of listed firms. In addition to the rising compliance costs, 
good firms experience a decrease in their information gain. The attractiveness of a listing 
diminishes  for  these  firms  because  the  value  of  non  listed  firms  increases  due  to  higher 
number of non listed good firms, although information revelation is perfect on the exchange. 
If  the  difference  in  compliance  costs  is  high  ( T c c    ),  good  firms  with  high 
compliance costs are deterred from listing while bad firms with small costs still list and there 
is no level of listing requirements separating both groups of firms. In this case, there is a range 
of small listing requirements at which only bad firms are deterred from listing when the signal 
precision increases.
11 Inside this range, the number of bad firms decreases monotonically with 
the signal precision. There is also a range of high listing requirements for which only good 
                                                 
10 The precision,  sep   , is such that ICb is binding for the bad firm with the lowest compliance costs whereas 
ICg is not binding for the good firms with the highest costs. 
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*           firms with low costs list.
12 As the precision increases inside this range, the number of listing 
good firms decreases monotonically. Finally, there is a range of medium listing requirements 
with signal precisions between the two extreme intervals described above. In this intermediate 
range, good as well as bad marginal firms vary simultaneously when the signal precision 
changes. This is the only range of signal precisions, inside which an increase in the level of 
listing requirements can lead either to a higher or to a smaller number listed firms of either 
qualities.
13   
 
Lemma 1 
Assume  that  the  signal  precision  is  inside  the  following  interval:   2 1, T T       ,  and  that 
T c c    . As the signal precision increases inside this interval: 
(i)  A higher number of good firms list if the increase in their information gain due to 
more precise information is large. 
(ii)  A higher number of bad firms list if the direct impact of more precise information 
on the surplus of good firms is positive and large enough. 
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All else equal, a higher signal precision leads to a higher number of listed good firms 
if the increase in their information gain due directly to more precise information exceeds the 
larger  compliance  costs.  Regarding  bad  firms,  their  number  diminishes  with  the  signal 
precision, all else equal. Without considering the indirect effects of changes in the signal 
precision on the information gains of firms, the proportion of listed good firms increases on 
the  exchange. However, this  raises the information  gain  of all firms,  since the beliefs of 
investors shift upwards when the proportion of good firms increases on the exchange. Good 
firms benefit from the higher signal as well as the change in the proportions of firms. If these 
benefits offset the higher cost induced by a higher signal precision, the number of listed good 
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13 Following ICg and ICb, marginal firms can only increase if  h i c c 
*  with  b g i ,   firms increases with the precision. The direct gain of good firms (which is net of compliance 
costs)  related  to  a  change  in  the  precision  does  not  need  to    be  positive  since  it  is 
complemented by the indirect effect from the changing proportion of firms. 
As  the  signal  precision  increases,  the  unique  benefit  of  bad  firms  stems  from  the 
higher proportion of good firms on the exchange. If a higher number of good firms is attracted 
on the exchange, the number of bad firms only increases if the additional good firms are 
numerous enough, i.e. when the information gain of good firms is large. In this case, the loss 
of bad firms related to more precise information and higher compliance costs can be offset by 
the general upward shift in information gains due to the higher number of listed good firms. 
Thus,  although  bad  firms  must  disclose  more  precise  information  about  their  type,  they 
benefit from a better possibility to hide among good firms. Also, since fewer good firms 
remain unlisted, the value of unlisted firms decreases, which induces even more bad firms to 
list on the exchange. 
 
3.3.  Exchange’s decision 
 
The revenue of the exchange stems only from the listing fee which is proportional to 
the  market  value  of  listed  firms.  The  exchange  can  either  set  a  small  level  of  listing 
requirements to list many firms (including many bad firms) in which case it receives a small 
income per firm. The exchange can also set a high level of listing requirements excluding bad 
firms from listing to increase the market value of the remaining listed firms and enhance 









Proposition 1 (i)  If separation of good and bad firms is possible, the exchange sets a level of listing 
requirements deterring all bad firms from listing if and only if  ) ( )
~
(      sep for 
all  sep  
~
 . This level of listing requirements is determined by: 
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Otherwise, the optimal level of listing requirements is always smaller than  sep 
~
. 
(ii)  If separation of good and bad firms is not possible, the exchange sets a level of 
listing requirements at which all bad firms and good firms with high costs are 
deterred from listing, 
~ ~
, if and only if  ) ( )
~ ~
(       for all   
~ ~
 . This level of 
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(iii)  sep  
~ ~ ~
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If the cost interval is small enough to satisfy equation 3, the exchange can implement a 
separating equilibrium for a high enough level of listing requirements. This is only optimal if 
the small number of listed firms - only good firms list in this case - is compensated by the 
valuation gain of good firms. In this case, the exchange never sets the precision above  sep   
since this lowers the number of listing firms but does not increase their value.   
If the cost interval is high and separation impossible, good and bad firms always pool 
either on the exchange or outside the exchange. In equilibrium, the exchange sets either a 
signal precision at which only good firms list, 
~ ~
, or a lower signal precision at which firms 
of both types list. As in the previous case, a signal precision higher than 
~ ~
 is never optimal 
since it reduces the number of listed firms without increasing their value. It is implicitly 
assumed here that good firms with high compliance costs stop listing while bad firms with 
small costs still list. This lowers the gain of a listing of bad firms since the proportion of good 
firms on the exchange is smaller compared to a situation in which separation of firms is 
possible. Therefore, the bad firm with the smallest compliance cost level is deterred from 
listing at a smaller signal precision than when separation is possible: 
sep  
~ ~ ~
  .     
  The highest level of listing requirements the exchange can set in equilibrium,  sep 
~
, 
increases the higher the gain is that bad firms obtain from listing. This is the case the higher the growth opportunity is, the smaller the minimum quality is, the higher the difference in 
qualities is, and the smaller the listing fee is. However, the higher sep 
~
 is, the smaller is the 
valuation gain that good firms obtain through separating from bad firms through a listing on 
the  exchange.  This  reduces  the  additional  profit  of  separation  and  renders  a  separating 
equilibrium less likely. Although a high proportion of good firms in the economy translates 
into a high number of listed firms in the case of separation, it also reduces the valuation gain 
good firms obtain from separation. Thus, a high proportion of good firms in the economy 
reduces the likelihood that the exchange implements the separating equilibrium and sets the 
highest level of listing requirements. 
 
4.   Information efficiency and welfare 
 
4.1. Information efficiency 
 
The efficiency of expected values increases, the closer these values are to their true 
value. The signal released when firms list contributes to render the values of listed firms more 
efficient, ceteris paribus. However, since listing requirements influence the distribution of 
firms on and outside the exchange, the existence of an exchange also affects the efficiency of 
the values of non listed firms. The measure for efficiency used here reflects the magnitude of 
the  reduction  of  information  asymmetry  in  the  entire  economy.  The  less  information 
asymmetry remains after the listing, the more informative is the listing and the more efficient 
is  the  equilibrium.  Initially  the  market  values  of  all  firms  are  distorted  as  bad  firms  are 
overvalued and good firms undervalued. The listing is able to reduce this distortion at least for 
a sub-set of firms by revealing information about the firms’ type. In the best case, firms are 
valued at their true value after the listing has taken place.  
The  precision  of  information  affects  efficiency  in  several  ways.  Its  direct  effect 
contributes to improving the efficiency of the values of all listed firms since it leads to a 
positive information gain for good firms and a negative information gain for bad firms. The 
indirect effects of the signal precision can either enhance efficiency or reduce it compared to a 
situation  without  exchange.  However,  since  the  number  of  good  firms  that  list  is  always 
higher than the number of bad ones, the proportion of good firms listed on the exchange is 
higher than in the entire economy. As a consequence, the value of good listed firms is always 
more efficient when the exchange exists. The same effect contributes to an increase in the 
value of bad firms and can make their value less efficient. Also, the value of non-listed good firms  becomes  less  efficient  whereas  the  value  non-listed  of  bad  firms  becomes  more 
efficient.  This  is  because  the  values  of  all  non-listed  firms  decrease  due  to  the  smaller 
proportion of good firms among non listed firms compared to a situation without exchange. 
Thus, only the values of listed good firms and non-listed bad firms become more efficient 
with the introduction of the exchange because of the different distributions of firms on and 
outside the exchange. 
 
Lemma 2 
The separating equilibrium leads to the highest efficiency in the economy as well as on the 
exchange since all firms are valued at their true value. All other equilibria lead to a lower 
efficiency. 
 
When the signal precision increases, the values of listed firms become more efficient 
provided  that  the  distributions  of  listed  firms  are  held  constant.  In  this  case,  the  signal 
precision has no impact on the efficiency of the values of non listed firms. However, except if 
the conditions of lemma 1 are satisfied, a smaller number of firms list. Thus, a smaller number 
of good firms benefits from a more efficient value. The additional non listed good firms incur 
an efficiency loss. Since also more bad firms are not listed, the impact of an increase in the 
signal precision on non listed firms is undetermined. Thus, while higher listing requirements 
improve  the  efficiency  of  a  small  group  of  firms,  it  leads  to  a  higher  number  of  firms 
incurring efficiency losses. As a result, its effect on the average efficiency in the economy is 
unclear. Depending on differences in the incentives of firms to list, and depending on how 
listing requirements affect the information gain of firms, a higher level of listing requirements 
does not necessarily improve efficiency in the economy.  
In all equilibria, a listing conveys information to the market unless the exchange sets 
its  listing  requirement  level  at  0.5.  However,  inefficiency  arises  due  to  two  factors:  the 
imperfect precision of the signal conveyed by the listed firms and the listing behavior of 
firms.  If  all  good  firms  list,  non  listed  firms  are  only  bad  ones.  Information  outside  the 
exchange is perfectly revealed, whereas there is information asymmetry on the exchange as 
long as some bad firms list. In this case the value of non listed firms is perfectly efficient. 
Although the signal precision is small, information is released by many firms. Economy wide 
efficiency is improved compared to a situation without exchange (provided that the direct 
effect of listing requirements is large enough for the values of bad listed firms to decrease). If 
only good firms list, information is perfectly revealed on the exchange. If only a fraction of good  firms  list,  information  asymmetry  exists  outside  the  exchange.  Since  there  is  no 
individual information release, inefficiency of non listed firms can be large. Only when firms 
completely separate according to their quality, information asymmetry is removed and all 
firms are valued at their true value.  
  Proposition  1  shows  that  if  the  cost  interval  is  small  and  under  some  particular 
economic circumstances, the exchange sets a high enough level of listing requirements to 
achieve  separation  of  firms  in  equilibrium.  In  this  case,  a  listing  certifies  efficiently  the 
quality  of  firms.  Otherwise,  information  asymmetry  on  the  exchange  and/or  outside  the 
exchange always impedes efficiency, in which case the listing does not certify efficiently the 
quality  of  firms.  The  certification  role  of  listing  is  indeed  related  to  the  level  of  listing 
requirements. However, it is determined by the incentives of firms to list and in particular by 
the  possibility  for  firms  to  separate  according  to  their  quality.  The  differences  in  firms’ 
incentives determine not only the optimal decision of the exchange, but also the feasibility of 
an  efficient  certification  through  listing.  If  firms  differ  strongly  in  listing  incentives,  an 
efficient certification is not possible because of self-selection of firms that adversely affects 




Because  signalling  is  costly  and  because  these  costs  differ  across  firms,  listing 
requirements do not necessarily enhance welfare. Listed firms realize a growth opportunity 
which increases welfare, but this occurs at the expense of compliance costs which reduces 
welfare. Social welfare is also affected by the inefficient valuations of firms. However, with 
some additional assumptions, the welfare gains and losses related to information asymmetry 
offset each other. If a firm lists, the old shareholders sell the firm entirely to new shareholders. 
If the firm is a good one and there is information asymmetry, they sell the firm below its value 
and  incur  therefore  a  welfare  loss.  However,  this  welfare  loss  is  also  a  welfare  gain  for 
investors who buy the firm cheaper than its final payoff. Thus gains and losses are offset. If 
the old shareholders sell an overvalued bad firm, they have a welfare gain which corresponds 
to the welfare loss of new shareholders. If the firm does not list, old shareholders keep their 
shares until the payoff is realized and are therefore not affected by changes in the value of 
their shares due to information revelation. Under these conditions, changes in the value of 
firms do not affect social welfare. To assess welfare effects related to changes in listing requirements, a measure, W, is 
computed by adding compliance costs and realized growth opportunities by listed firms. The 
level of listing requirements impacts welfare directly by influencing the size of compliance 
costs and indirectly by determining the number of realized growth opportunities. A higher 
number of listed firms has an ambiguous effect on welfare since more firms realize their 
growth opportunity but more firms also bear compliance costs.  
 
Lemma3 
(i)  If separation of firms according to their quality is possible ( T c c    ), welfare 
increases in the level of listing requirements if the growth opportunity is small and 
if the change in the marginal bad firm is large.  
(ii)  If separation of firms is not possible( T c c    ), welfare increases in the level of 
listing requirements in two cases: 
a.  If more firms are attracted on the exchange and the growth opportunity is large 
b.  If fewer firms are attracted on the exchange and the growth opportunity is 
small 
 
Whether welfare increases or decreases with the level of listing requirements depends 
on the listing behavior of firms. If separation of firms according to their quality is possible 
and the exchange sets a level of listing requirements which is smaller than  sep  , increasing the 
precision reduces the number of listed bad firms and increases the compliance costs of those 
firms that remain listed. If the growth opportunity is smaller than the cost savings, welfare 
increase in the signal precision only if the change in the marginal bad firm is large enough. 
Otherwise, welfare never increases with the signal precision. The cost savings related to the 
smaller  number  of  bad  listed  firms  must  compensate  not  only  their  forgon e  growth 
opportunity but also the higher costs borne by all other listed firms.  If the exchange sets  sep 
in equilibrium, the negative welfare effects due to fewer realized growth opportunities and 
higher compliance costs are the highest. Thus, there is a tension between achieving a high 
information  efficiency  and  keeping  a  high  welfare  in  the  economy.  The  most  efficient 
equilibrium does not necessarily correspond to the highest level of welfare. If separation of 
firms is not possible, the effects of an increasing precision on welfare depend on the listing 
behavior of firms. If more firms are attracted into the market, more firms will also bear higher 
compliance  costs.  In  this  case,  welfare  increases  only  if  the  growth  opportunity  is  large enough. If, in contrast, the number of listed firms diminishes, the size of the forgone growth 
opportunity  must  be  small  enough  as  compared  to  the  decrease  in  compliance  costs,  for 
welfare to increase.  
Information efficiency may not be socially beneficial (according to the definition of 
social welfare given above) because it occurs at a cost which is not necessarily compensated 
by social gains. However, information efficiency can bring many advantages. If good firms 
are not confounded with bad ones, they may be able to raise capital at lower cost and thus 
realize  more  investment  opportunities.  Informative  prices  are  also  useful  to  structure  the 
incentives of managers (Holmström and Tirole (1993)), or the  incentives of an insider to 
engage in value-increasing activities (Faure-Grimaud and Gromb (2004)). Also, consumers 
may be able to infer the quality of the firms’ products from the stock price (Staughton et al. 
(2001)). 
 
5.  Segmentation 
 
In many countries, listing requirements are at least partially imposed by regulators 
(Macey  and  O’Hara  (2005)).  However,  some  exchanges  have  created  lightly  regulated 
segments which provide listing services but are not subject to the regulation prevailing on 
their main segments. This is for instance the case with the Alternative Investment Market 
(AIM) which has been created by the London Stock Exchange: firms listing on the AIM have 
to comply neither with requirements imposed by the European Directives nor with full FSA 
requirements.
14 Over the last years, a growing number of exchanges have set up lower tier 
segments resembling the AIM in London.
15 This is in particular the case in the US where a 
new listing venue - OTCQX - has been created, on which firms can list without complying 
with SEC rules.
16 At the opposite, some exchanges have also created segments with stricter 
regulation than the one imposed by their national regulator. This has been the case on the 
Brazilian stock market, which created tightly regulated segments (Chavez and Silva (2006)). 
This has also been the case on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, a case which is extensively 
described and analyzed in the third chapter of this thesis. 
                                                 
14 The Financial Services Authority (FSA) determines and controls the admission rules for firms wishing to list 
their  shares  on  the  regulated  market  on  the  London  Stock  Exchange.  EU  Directives  concerning  listing 
requirements are the Transparency Directive (2004/109/EC), the Prospectus Directive (2003/71/EC) and the 
Directive on statutory audits and annual accounts (2006/43/EC). 
15 The Italian stock exchange created the Mercato Expandi, the pan-European stock market Euronext launched 
Alternext, Deutsche Börse launched the Entry Standard and the Scandinavian Exchange Nordic OMX created 
the First North. See Mendoza (2008) for a discussion about the creation of these segments. 
16 See : www.otcqx.com An argument advanced against strong regulation is that firms differ in their need for 
regulation (Mendoza (2008)). Lemmata 2 and 3 show that differences in incentives of firms to 
list lead to the exclusion of many firms from listing and might impede efficiency as well as 
welfare, and eventually weaken the beneficial effect of listing requirements. In this context, 
creating differently regulated segments may mitigate negative effects due to the self-selection 
of firms. This section analyses the consequences related to the creation of a more regulated 
segment (upper tier segment) or a less regulated segment (lower tier segment) if a level of 
listing requirements, reg  , is imposed exogenously by a regulator.  
If the exchange creates an additional segment (with  reg    ), the segment with the 
signal precision imposed by the regulator,  reg  , is labelled the “main segment” further on. 
Compared to the situation in which only the main segment exists, the possibility to list on 
another differently regulated venue induces some firms that would have listed anyway, to list 
on the additional segment instead of the main one, and might also induce firms that would not 
have listed otherwise, to list on one of both segments. Firms which list on the exchange when 
there is no segmentation, list on the additional segment if and only if the valuation gain they 
obtain is larger than the additional compliance costs in the case of an upper tier segment, or if 
the valuation loss is compensated by compliance cost savings in the case of a lower tier 
segment. The growth opportunity and the listing fees are assumed to be the same on both 
listing venues.  
If two segments exist, the proportion of good firms on the main segment is likely to 
change. In this case, the valuation gain firms obtain by listing on the main segment also 
changes, even though the listing requirements remain the same. The informativeness of a 
listing on both listing venues depends now on the marginal firms listing on the main segment, 
*
,m g c  and 
*
,m b c , and on the marginal firms listing on the additional segment created by the 
exchange: 
*
,s g c  and 
*
,s b c .
17 Since the creation of an additional segment changes the number of 
listing firms and their listing place, it changes also the value of unlisted firms. 
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Marginal firms listing on the additional segment are determined by the following equations 
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     Proposition 2 
(i)  If the exchange creates an upper tier segment, the number of firms listing on the 
main segment decreases compared to the situation without segmentation: 
* *
, g m g c c   
and 
* *
, b m b c c  .  
(ii)  If  the  exchange  creates  a  lower  tier  segment,  the  total  number  of  listed  firms 
always increases. The number of listed firms on the main segment decreases. 
 
5.1. Upper tier segment 
 
If  the  exchange  sets  up  an  upper  tier  segment  with  reg    ,  firms  listing  on  this 
segment bear a higher cost than if they list on the main segment. Thus, firms only list on the 
upper tier segment if they expect a valuation increase that offsets the higher cost. If some 
good firms with low costs expect an information gain which is large enough to offset the 
higher compliance costs, they list on this segment (instead of listing on the main segment). 
However, if there are only good firms on the additional segment, some bad firms with low 
costs might also list join it. Despite the higher signal precision which reduces their direct gain 
from listing on the upper tier segment, they can better hide among good firms and expect 
therefore  a  large  information  gain.  Good  firms  always  benefit  more  from  a  more  tightly 
regulated segment than bad firms. Therefore, the marginal good firm listing on the upper tier 
segment, 
*
,s g c , is always higher than the marginal bad firm, 
*
,s b c . 
The proportion of good firms among listed firms differs on both segments. Since a 
higher number of good firms than bad ones lists on the upper tier segment instead of the main 
one, the proportion of good firms on the upper tier segment is larger than on the main segment 
all else equal. This reduces the benefit of a listing on the main segment since the beliefs of 
investors to observe a good firm shift down. Although the signal precision remains the same 
on the main segment, the information gain of firms listing on this segment is smaller than in 
the  case  without  segmentation.  This  is  only  due  to  the  self-selection  of  firms  into  both 
segments and to the resulting improved separation of firms according to their quality. The 
main segment retains mainly bad firms while the upper tier segment attracts mainly good 
firms. The smaller information gain leads to smaller marginal firms of both types of firms 
listed on the main segment.  
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     The proportions of listed firms on the main segment changes for two reasons: firms 
with small costs list on the upper tier segment and firms with high costs leave the exchange 
completely. If creating an upper tier segment is optimal for the exchange, the proportion of 
good firms is always higher on this segment than on the main segment. If these proportions 
were equal, no bad firm would list on the upper tier segment since in addition to paying 
higher  compliance  costs  and  releasing  a  more  precise  signal,  they  would  not  obtain  a 
valuation  gain  related  to  the  proportion  of  good  firms.  However,  since  this  segment  still 
remains attractive for good firms, the proportion of good firms is equal to one on the upper 
tier segment (good firms are the only firms to list on this segment) and lower than one on the 
main segment which contradicts the assumption of equal proportions. Thus, it cannot be true 
in equilibrium. If the proportion of good firms was higher on the main segment, bad firms 
would  incur  an  even  higher  loss  if  they  listed  on  the  upper  tier  segment.  By  a  similar 
argument, this cannot be an equilibrium situation either. An equilibrium is only possible if the 
proportion of good firms on the upper tier segment is higher than on the main segment. This 
reduces the value of firms remaining on the main segment and deters more firms of both types 
from listing on this segment. To sum up, the creation of a listing venue with higher standards 
on which firms with low costs can better signal their type leads to the exclusion of firms with 
high  costs  from  the  less  regulated  segment.  The  valuation  gain  on  the  main  segment 
diminishes although the level of listing requirements remains the same. 
When separation of firms according to their quality is possible, only bad firms which 
would list without segmentation are excluded from listing on the main segment. Their value is 
then equal to their true type which enhances overall efficiency. The values of good firms 
listing on the upper tier segment become more efficient. These efficiency gains stem not only 
from the higher signal precision on the upper tier segment, but also  from the induced self 
selection  of  good  firms  into  the  upper  tier  segment  and  bad  firms  outside  the  exchange. 
However,  the  induced  changes  in  listing  venues  create  social  costs  since  fewer  firms 
implement their growth opportunity and some firms bear higher compliance costs. If the size 
of the growth opportunity is large enough to offset the compliance cost savings of excluded 
firms, an upper tier segment always deteriorates welfare. 
When separation of firms is not possible, the existence of an upper tier segment also 
deters good firms with high costs from listing on the main segment. In this case, efficiency 
deteriorates outside the exchange for good firms with high costs which pool with bad ones. 
The crowding out effect leads also to a smaller number of realized growth opportunities than 
when separation is possible. Thus, if incentives of firms of the same quality differ strongly and if marginal firms decrease with the precision, creating an upper tier segment exacerbates 
the welfare loss and does not necessarily improve efficiency. Only the good firms listed on 
the upper tier segment always benefits from a high efficiency. If the marginal good firms 
increase in the precision, the exchange lists more good firms on its upper tier segment. This 
increases the attractiveness of this segment and induces even more firms to list on the upper 
tier segment instead of  the main segment.  In this  case, more firms  benefit  from  a better 
efficiency. However, this also exacerbates the exclusion effect of firms with high costs since 
expected revaluations on the main segment become smaller. 
 
5.2. Lower tier segment 
 
If the exchange creates a lower tier segment, firms with high compliance costs which 
would have listed on the main segment without segmentation, list on the lower tier segment 
instead. The lower signal precision benefits to bad firms since they must reveal less precise 
information. Good firms incur a valuation loss directly related to the lower signal precision.  
Firms of both types also benefit from the smaller compliance costs. Since bad firms benefit 
more from lower listing requirements than good ones, more of them switch down to the lower 
tier segment. Thus, the proportion of bad firms is higher on the lower tier segment than on the 
main segment. In, contrast, this proportion diminishes on the main segment which leads to 
higher valuations on this segment. The lower tier segment not only attracts firms with low 
costs that would have listed on the main segment without segmentation, it also attracts firms 
with even higher compliance costs that would not have listed without segmentation.  
If the cost difference of firms is small enough to allow for separation of firms, new 
listing firms are only bad firms since all good firms list anyway. As before, firms separate not 
only according to their costs but also according to their quality. The main segment looses 
mainly listings from bad firms. Thus, the value of the remaining good firms becomes more 
efficient although the listing requirements remain the same. Good firms listing on the lower 
tier segment incur, as before, an efficiency loss. Efficiency also decreases for newly listed bad 
firms since they were valued at their true value outside the exchange, but are pooled with 
some good firms and are thus on average overvalued. As a consequence, the effects of the 
existence  of  a  lower  tier  segment  on  information  efficiency  in  the  economy  are  mixed 
compared to a situation without segmentation. Only the main segment benefits in terms of 
efficiency. More firms realize their growth opportunity which improves welfare. However, 
more high cost firms also pay compliance costs reducing welfare. If the listing requirements on the lower tier segment are small and the growth opportunity high enough, introducing a 
lower tier segment improves welfare.  
If firms cannot separate, a lower tier segment allows also some good firms to list and 
to realize their growth opportunity. Since these firms were pooled with bad firms outside the 
exchange and benefit from the release of information on the exchange (even though it is not 
precise), their values become on average more efficient. This also increases efficiency outside 
the exchange. Thus, compared to a situation without the lower tier segment, introducing such 
a segment if the incentives  of firms  are very diverging has  better efficiency and welfare 
consequence than when these incentives are similar. 
Regardless of whether an exchange creates an upper or lower tier segment, firms listed 
on  the  more  tightly  regulated  segment  benefit  from  a  higher  valuation  in  the  case  of 
segmentation. However, the source of the valuation gain is different depending on which of 
both segments is implemented. In both cases, firms listed on the more regulated segment 
benefit from a separation effect since, in the case of segmentation, the proportion of good 
firms is higher on the more regulated segment than in a situation in which the firms concerned 
can  only  list  on  the  main  segment.  However,  firms  on  the  upper  tier  segment  benefit  in 
addition from the higher level of listing requirements. If the exchange implements a lower tier 
segment, firms listed on the main segment only benefit from the separation of good and bad 
firms since the signal precision remains the same on the main segment. 
 
6.  Implications 
 
6.1. Competition for listings 
 
 Although this model is developed under the assumption of a monopoly exchange, its 
insights about the incentives of firms to list on a more tightly regulated exchange can be 
useful in considerations about how tighter listing requirements affect competition in listings. 
There  is  a  debate  about  whether  the  US  exchanges  have  lost  their  competitiveness  with 
respect  to  listings  as  a  consequence  of  the  adoption  of  the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act  in  2002. 
Studies highlight the existence of a pike of voluntary SEC deregistrations or delistings of US 
firms  as  well  as  foreign  firms  that  seems  to  be  related  to  the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act. 
Deregistrations are related to individual characteristics of firms such as their size, their future 
prospects or their ownership structure since these characteristics determine the ability of firms to bear possibly larger costs
18 as well as the components of these costs (as an example: firms 
with a concentrated ownership are assumed to be more subject to diversion of cash flows and 
might  therefore  incur  larger  costs  to  comply  with  SOX  than  firms  with  a  dispersed 
ownership).The  results  of  these  studies  show  that  firms  which  deregister  are  on  average 
smaller and less profitable than firms which remained listed. In a similar perspective, Doidge 
at al. (2009) find that the smaller number of non US firms which cross listed on an American 
exchange following the introduction of the Sarbanes Oxley Act is related to changes in the 
characteristics  of  firms.  According  to  their  evidence,  the  probability  to  cross  list  has  not 
changed after the passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act when individual characteristics of firms 
are  taken  into  consideration.  They  conclude  that  although  fewer  firms  cross-list,  US 
exchanges  have  remained  attractive  for  foreign  firms  since  those  firms  that  cross-list 
experience  a  cross-listing  premium.  Piotroski  and  Srivinasan  (2008),  find  that  while  the 
attractiveness  of  the  NYSE  relative  to  the  LSE  Main  market  has  not  changed  after  the 
adoption of the Sarbanes Oxley Act, the Nasdaq has become less attractive relative to the 
AIM. The SOX Act has deterred small firms from listing in the US. The present analysis 
shows that individual characteristics of firms are not the only factors that have an influence on 
the gains and costs of firms related to more stringent listing requirements. The characteristics 
of the entire population of firms, among which some might list, also affect the gains related to 
an increase in listing requirements. The net gain firms obtain from listing if they come, for 
instance, from an industry in which some firms bear high proprietary costs and others not, is 
small and therefore these firms are less likely to list when listing requirements become more 
stringent. If an exchange tightens its listing requirements, it is likely to lose in particular the 
listings of firms from industries with diverging preferences regarding listing requirements.  
 
6.2. Valuation effects related to listing requirements 
 
Several studies have highlighted positive valuation effects related to the tightness of 
listing requirements when firms cross-list (Doidge et al. 2004, 2009, Roosenboom and van 
Dijk 2007). They link these valuation changes to the existence of growth opportunities as well 
as the investor protection rules the firm is subject to in its home country.  The findings in the 
present analysis complement these studies by proposing a theory for a finer analysis of these 
valuation effects.  Since the effect of a particular level of listing requirements depends not 
only on the precision of the information revealed through compliance, but also on the type 
                                                 
18 Whether firms listed on US exchanges bear higher costs due to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act  is debated. and number of firms that comply, valuation effects after cross listings or changes of listing 
places should differ depending on three elements: the characteristics of the firms which cross 
list or change their listing place, the characteristics of the firms in the same sector or industry 
or coming from the same country, and the characteristics of firms listed on the exchange in 
question. In addition, the valuation effect should also depend on the structure of the exchange 
industry. Depending on whether there are several segments with different regulations, the 
firms listing on the most regulated segment will not be the same. In particular, the values of 
firms which list on an exchange with stringent listing requirements should increase more, if 
there are several differently regulated listing venues in the economy than if there were only 
this exchange. 
 
6.3. Incentives to extract private benefits 
 
The present analysis shows that bad firms are not necessarily better recognized the 
higher the level of listing requirements is, because changes in listing requirements affect the 
distribution of listed firms. Thus, if a high level of listing requirements attracts many good 
firms and few bad firms on the exchange, bad firms might be able to hide better than with a 
lower level of listing requirements. If this is the case, the higher level of listing requirements 
does not induce a manager or a controlling shareholder to extract a smaller amount of private 
benefits when the cost of private benefits is proportional to the probability to be recognized. 
This  can  be  illustrated  by  transforming  the  model  exposed  in  Doidge  et  al.  (2004).  The 
authors assume, following La Porta et al. (2002) that the cost a controlling shareholder incurs 
when he diverts cash-flows increases the stricter investor protection rules are. As a result, the 
fraction of diverted cash flows diminishes with a more stringent regulation. Assume similar to 
Doidge et al. (2004) that a controlling shareholder detains a fraction  k  in the capital of its 
firm and diverts a fraction    of the cash flows, g x . If he is recognized he is punished and 
bears a cost  x p p g gs bs ) , ( 5 . 0
2   for this activity, where the function  ) , ( gs bs p p g represents the 
probability to be recognized with  0    bs p g  and  0    gs p g .  He determines the fraction 
of  cash  flows  he  diverts  to  maximize  its  objective  function:
g g gs bs g x x p p g x k Max   
    ) ) , ( 5 . 0 ) 1 ( (
2 . The optimal fraction of diverted cash flows is: 
) , (
1 *
gs bs p p kg
k 
  . Hence, if an increase in listing requirements changes the distribution of listed firms in a way that increases the probabilities bs p  and  gs p , the fraction of extracted 
private benefits increases. 
 
6.4. Listing place choices and the decisions of a profit maximizing exchange 
 
The reaction of firms to changes in regulations and the choice of listing places by 
firms from different sectors, industries or geographical regions is observable. Studies on the 
choice of cross-listing places  link the cross-listing decision to characteristics of firms such as 
the existence of growth opportunities or their profitability (see for instance Pagano et  al. 
(2002) and  Doidge et al. (2009)) or to characteristics of home and host countries (see for 
instance Sarkissian and Schill (2004, 2009)). These studies show that differences in these 
characteristics affect the choice of a cross-listing place.  This information can be useful to 
assess decisions of a profit maximizing exchange upon listing requirements or the existence of 
differently regulated segments. Fama and French (2004) observe that the death rate of listed 
firms has increased in the last decades because a higher number of young and less profitable 
firms has been admitted on stock markets. They argue that listing requirements have become 
more lax as a result of the changing demand and supply of shares. An implication of the 
present model is that a self-regulated profit maximizing exchange adapts its listing standards 
to economic conditions. If, for instance, the difference in compliance costs is initially small to 
allow  separation  of  firms,  but  increases  in  a  way  that  makes  separation  impossible,  the 
exchange necessarily reduces the level of listing requirements because the listing behavior of 
firms reduces the gain  of listed firms related to any level of listing requirements.  Thus, 
observing  the  overall  characteristics  of  firms  and  the  listing  behavior  of  firms  allows 
implications  about  how  a  profit  maximizing  exchanges  takes  decisions  on  listing 
requirements. This is of particular interest today, since exchanges are increasingly turned into 
profit  maximizing  entities  and  some  have  discretion  in  setting  listing  standards.  Such 
observations  could  contribute  to  the  intensifying  policy  debate  about  whether  exchanges 
should keep the power to set listing requirements. 
 
 
6.5. Listing place choices and the characteristics of firms 
 
Observing  the  listing  behavior  of  firms  also  allows  inferences  on  hidden 
characteristics  of  firms.  In  particular,  analyzing  listing  and  delisting  decisions  as  well  as valuation gains in relation to listing and disclosure requirements may be an indication about 
the existence of proprietary costs of firms. This could complement the approach used to detect 
the  existence  of  proprietary  costs  which  consists  in  analyzing  the  content  of  information 
released by firms, in particular whether firms release detailed information about their business 
segments (Healy and Palepu (2001), Leuz (2004), Nichols and Street (2007)). 
  If an exchange creates an additional listing venue which has a different regulation than 
the existing one, some firms switch to the new venue because of their compliance costs and 
not  because  of  their  quality.  Thus,  if  a  segment  with  a  low  regulation  is  created,  firms 
changing their listing place from the highly regulated segment to the new segment are not 
necessarily bad firms since they may simply bear high compliance costs and a lower level of 
listing requirements may lead to a higher market value (net of listing costs) for these firms. 
The same is true for firms switching to a more tightly regulated segment since they may be 
bad firms with low costs. The idea that a change in the listing place form a more regulated to 
a less regulated listing venue or vice versa is not necessarily a signal about the quality of 
firms, is consistent with result in Jenkinson and Ramadorai (2008) who show that initial stock 
price reactions after firms listed on the London Stock Exchange switch from the main market 
to the AIM and vice versa are reversed after some months. 
 
7.  Conclusion 
 
The model developed in this chapter shows that differences in incentives of firms to list 
can have an impact on the decision of exchanges concerning the level of listing requirements 
they set, and on the gains obtained by firms when they list on an exchange with stringent 
listing requirements. When firms bear listing costs that are uncorrelated with their quality, 
changing the level of listing requirements or introducing additional segments with different 
listing requirements changes the distribution of listed firms and affects thereby indirectly the 
values of listed firms. This indirect effect can either enforce or weaken the direct impact of 
more precise information on the value of firms. 
If the difference in the incentives to list among firms of the same quality is small, the 
exchange might be induced to set a high level of listing requirements, which leads to a high 
information efficiency in the economy. If these differences are large, the exchange never sets 
a high level of listing requirements and efficiency is impeded. This analysis yields a number of empirical implications. They concern competition for 
listings,  valuation  effects  related  to  changes  in  listing  requirements,  the  impact  of  listing 
requirements  on  the  incentives  of  managers  or  controlling  shareholders  to  extract  private 
benefits, the relationship between the choice of a listing place by firms and decisions of a 
profit maximizing exchange, and finally, the link between the choice of a listing place by 
firms and what it signals about the characteristics of firms. 
In this model, firms are assumed not to disclose their type voluntarily. An interesting 
extension of the present model would be to analyze how changes in listing requirements affect 
the decision of firms to voluntarily disclose information to the market. Due to the different 
compliance costs, good firms are likely to be imitated by bad firms regarding the choice of 
information precision. Because changes in listing requirements affect the distribution of listed 
firms, they might have an impact on the decisions regarding voluntary disclosure by listed and 
non listed firms. This question is left for future research. 
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2   (A2) 
 
First case:  T c c     
If  T c c    , firms separate at  sep  . For levels of listing requirements below this threshold, 














. For levels of listing requirements above this 














Second case:  T c c     
If  T c c    , there is a range of   in which the good and the bad marginal firms change 
simultaneously when the listing requirements change. The lower bound of this range,  1 T  , is 
such that ICg is binding for the good firms with the highest costs. Since the information gain 
of the bad firms with the highest costs is smaller than the one of the good firms with the 
highest costs,  h b c c  ~  at this level of signal precision. The upper bound of this range,  2 T  , is 
such that ICb is binding for the bad firm with the lowest cost. Since the condition stated in 
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Rearranging terms in equations A1 and A2 and solving for 
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x I x fx z f B  represents the loss directly related to a change 
in   incurred by bad firms. The left term is the impact of the higher cost due to a higher   
and the right term is the decrease of the information gain of bad firms. 
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represents the effect of a change in the marginal bad firm on the 
valuation gain of bad firms. The more bad firms list, the smaller is their valuation gain which 
induces less of them to list.  b D  reduces 
 









x I x fx z f G ) 1 (
2
 is the valuation gain directly related to a change 
in  experienced by good firms . The left term is the impact of higher costs when   increases 



















represents the effect of a change in the marginal good firm on the 
valuation gain of good firms. The more good firms list, the higher is their information gain 
which induces more of them to list. In what follows, I make the assumption that  0  g D . 
Although mathematically,  0  g D is possible for some parameters, it makes little economic 
sense to assume that an increase in the marginal good firms leading to a higher valuation gain 
reduces the equilibrium marginal good firm. 
The marginal good firm increases in   if and only if the valuation gain of good firms directly 





















The direct gain associated with the change in   has not to be necessarily positive for this 
condition to hold, since the right hand side of the inequality is negative. 
The marginal bad firm increases in   if and only if G is positive and large enough: 
0 ~    2
        0
~ 2

   










 Proposition 1 
First case:  T c c     
Separation  is  possible  if T c c    .  The  exchange  sets  the  level  of  listing  requirements 
separating good firms from bad firms, sep  , if and only if the income from the listing fee is 





MV MV  


 ) 1 (
) ~ (
.  sep   is such that 
l b c c  ~   and  h g c c  ~ :    ) , , ( ) 1 (
2
sep l h b b
l
sep c c I x fx z f
c
          .  For  levels  of  listing 
requirements above sep  ,  sep    , the value of the listed good firms does not increase in   







. As a 
consequence the profit of the exchange decreases for sep     . The exchange never sets the 
listing requirement above sep  . If the listing income is not the highest in the case of separation 
of firms, the exchange optimally sets a smaller level of listing requirements,  sep     . 
 
Second case:  T c c     
If separation is not possible, the exchange sets 
'
sep  at which no bad firm and a subset of good 
firms list. This is optimal if and only if: 
) ) ( ~ ( ) 1 )( ~ ( ) ~ (
'
l sep g g l b b l g g c c x c c MV c c MV           . 
'
sep  is determined such that  l b c c  ~  
and  h g l c c c   ~ :    ) , , ~ ( ) 1 (
2 ' '
sep l g b b
l
sep c c I x fx z f
c
          .  A  higher  precision      (
'
sep    ) is never optimal for the exchange since the number of listed firms decreases but their 
value  remains  constant  at  g x .  If  it  is  not  optimal  to  exclude  bad  firms  from  listing,  the 
exchange sets
'
sep    in equilibrium. As ) , , ~ ( ) , , (
'
sep l g b sep l h b c c I c c I       , sep sep   
'  . 
 
Lemma 2 
The  efficiency  measure  is  computed  by  adding  the  average  misevaluations  of  all  firms 
(differences between their true value and their market value gross of listing costs) weighted 
by the number of firms concerned by the specific misevaluation. It accounts for the size of misevaluation as well as for the number of firms concerned. It is positive by construction. 
Efficiency is the highest when  0  E . 
 
  ) )( ~ ( ) )( ~ (
) 1 (
                
) )( ~ ( ) )( ~ (
b nl b h b b l b
nl g g h g g l g
x MV c c x MV c c
c
MV x c c MV x c c
c
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        (A5) 
Rearranging terms yields: 
 
0 ) ) 2 1 ( (                            
) ) )( 1 ( )( ~ )( 1 ( ) ) ( )( ~ (
    
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      (A6) 
In the case of the separating equilibrium,  1   bs gs p p ,  h g c c  ~ ,  l b c c  ~  and  0  nl p . This 
gives  0        x x E . The separating equilibrium yields the highest possible efficiency. 
In all other equilibria, at least one term of equation (A5) is strictly positive. Thus, efficiency is 
never the highest. 
) ( ( bs gs bs b g p p p x x MV        
) )( 1 ( ( bs gs bs b b p p p x x MV         
b nl g nl nl x p x p MV ) 1 (     
 
Lemma 3 
The welfare measure is  computed by subtracting total  compliance costs from  the sum  of 

















































         (A7) 
Developing and rearranging terms yields: 
     
2 2 2
2
) ~ )( 1 ( ) ~ (
4
~ ) 1 ( ~ 1
l b g l b g c c c c c c z
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          (A8) 
In the case separation is possible,  h g c c  ~ . Welfare increases in the precision if and only if: 

 
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          (A9) 
The inequality (A9) can only hold if z is small enough:  0 ~
2
2
  b c z

.  
If separation is not possible, welfare increases in the precision if and only if:  
2 2 2
2 2
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First case: upper tier segment (UTS) 
 is the signal precision on the UTS and  reg   is the signal precision on the main segment. 
Good firms list on the UTS if and only if   
2 2
2
) ( ) ( reg reg g g
c
I I          . Bad firms list on 
the UTS if and only if  
2 2
2
) ( ) ( reg reg b b
c
I I           . Consider h  as the proportion of good 
firms among listed firms on the UTS and  reg h  as the proportion of good firms among listed 
firms on the main segment. If  reg h h , and  ) ( ) ( reg b b I I      <0. Bad firms never list and 





V      .  However,  in  this  case, reg h h ,  which 
contradicts  the  assumption.  Thus,  reg h h   cannot  hold  in  equilibrium.  If  reg h h , 
0 ) ( ) (     reg g g I I    and 0 ) ( ) (     reg b b I I    if  h hreg   is high enough. Good firms list 










V      . 
Since the latter equation holds only if  reg h h , this case can be an equilibrium. 
 
Crowding out effect in the case of an UTS 
Assume that  m g g c c ,
~ ~    and  m b b c c ,
~ ~  . For   reg h h  to hold, the number of good firms listing 
on the UTS instead of the main segment must be higher than the number of bad firms listing 
on the UTS instead of the main segment.  s b s g c c , ,
~ ~  . This implies that the proportion of good 
firms among listed firms on the main segment in the case of segmentation is higher than 



















 . However, in this case, the information gains of 
firms listing on the main segment,  ) ( reg g I    and  ) ( reg b I    , diminish. This leads to smaller marginal firms on the main segment:   m g g c c ,
~ ~   and  m b b c c ,
~ ~  . Because the marginal firms on 
the main segment change when there is segmentation, the proportion of good firms on this 
segment also changes. If following the exit of some firms, this proportion increases to reach 
its former level or become larger, there is no reason for the firms that left to remain outside 
the market. However, the equilibrium condition for segmentation requires the proportion on 
the  main  segment  to  diminish  for  equal  marginal  firms.  Therefore,  this  cannot  be  an 
equilibrium.  As  a  consequence  an  equilibrium  with  segmentation  is  only  possible,  if  the 
proportion of good firms on the main segment remains below its level without segmentation. 
 
Second case: lower tier segment (LTS) 
 is the signal precision on the LTS and  reg   is the signal precision on the main segment. 
The argument for the existence of an equilibrium with a lower tier segment is similar to the 
previous case. Good firms list on the LTS if and only if   
2 2
2
) ( ) (          reg g reg g
c
I I . 
Bad firms list on the LTS if and only if  
2 2
2
) ( ) ( reg reg b b
c
I I           . Since reg     , the 
compliance costs on the lower tier segment are smaller and good firms might list on this 
segment even if  ) ( ) (   g reg g I I    is positive. Assume that the proportion of good firms is 
equal  on  both  segments,  reg h h .  In  this  case  0 ) ( ) (     reg b b I I   and 
0 ) ( ) (     reg g g I I   . All bad firms list on the lower tier segment instead of the main one 
and good firms list as long as the cost savings offset the smaller valuation gain. However, in 
this  case,  the  proportion  of  good  firms  on  the  main  segment  is  higher  than  on  the  LTS: 
reg h h . Thus segmentation cannot be an equilibrium with equal proportions of firms on both 
segments. The same contradiction exists if the proportion of good firms is assumed to be 
larger on the LTS. If  reg h h , all bad firms gain from listing on the LTS instead of the main 
segment. However, in this case  reg h h  ,which contradicts the assumption. If the proportion 
of good firms is larger on the main segment than on the LTS,  reg h h  ,bad firms list as long as 
the smaller proportion of good firms on the LTS does not offset the valuation gains from the 
lower listing requirements and the cost savings. Good firms list only if their valuation loss is 
offset by cost savings. Thus, an equilibrium with a LTS is only possible if  reg h h . 
 